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Abstract: The narrative of “Muslim identity” is fast becoming a key problem 
in Europe. The narrative, sustained by Islamic governments, movements and 
 intellectuals, blocks the way of “European Muslims” toward modern subjectivity 
and citizenship. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of literature and initia-
tives by critical Muslim intellectuals that challenge the narrative of “Muslim iden-
tity”. This paper offers philosophical-anthropological insights into the problem 
of “Muslim identity” in Europe through the cases of four Muslim intellectuals: 
T. Ramadan, M. Chebel, F. Benslama and L. Babès.
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“What Does God Say that I Should Be?”1 This question is not part of a Muslim 
theological manual. It was asked by Tariq Ramadan, one of the leading Muslim 
intellectuals in Europe while lecturing about “Muslim identity”. When I put this 
question in front of my students, many of them were suspicious of the validity of 
the question. Some of them think that the answer is evident: God wants Muslims 
to be believers (a tautology in this case) which renders Ramadan’s question rhe-
torical. There is a point to this answer as Ramadan claims that God wants some-
thing specific from „Muslims” in Europe and that Ramadan knows the answer. 
Others think that Muslims’ identities depend on their own choices (free will) and, 
therefore, God does not meddle in this matter. There is, however, a much more se-
rious paradox to Ramadan’s question: imagining a “Muslim identity” in Europe 
whereby the authority of God is needed to warrant Muslimness. Theology is used 
to support a political anthropology, although, in Ramadan’s perception, nothing 
separates the realms of God and that of human beings.
As we speak today, the notion of “Muslim identity” in Europe is rarely con-
tested. “Muslims” accepted to be identified as such and non-Muslims are satisfied 
with the designation of a whole range of populations as Muslims. Most partici-
pants in the public sphere seem to agree that “these people are Muslims” and they 
cannot help it anyway. It is what they are and Europe should cope with it.
* MTA-SZTE Research Group for the Study of Religious Culture, H-6722 Szeged, Egyetem u. 2. 
Hungary. Email: belhaj.abdessamad@gmail.com 
1 Ramadan 1999. 
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That being the case, the history of “these populations” urges us to criticize the nar-
rative of “Muslim identity”. As immigrants stepped into Europe from Africa and 
Asia in the fifties and sixties, they were not treated as “Muslims”, but as “invited 
workers”. Social identity defined what they were: Cheap male workers whose 
ethnic, cultural or religious stock was irrelevant. However, as the descendants 
of these workers were born in Europe, but not Europeans nor “imported work-
ers”, they became for a while identity-less, until the “Muslim identity” came by 
the end of the eighties to fill the gap. A vicious identity circle came into existence 
and the shift from social to religious identity transformed entirely the nature of 
the problem. Both „Muslims” and “non-Muslims” accepted the conversion of the 
problem into a “Muslim problem”. The process is indeed complex. Political actors 
used a phenomenon they observed in the „ descendants of immigrants”, namely 
an islamisation since the seventies, led by exiled Islamists and agents of different 
“Muslim countries”, to justify a discursive and political machine the dynamic of 
which is to bog down a problem of immigration, citizenship and integration.
It is argued here that the narrative of “Muslim identity” is a simulacrum (Jean 
Baudrillard) of a discursive tradition (Talal Asad). Muslim states and  Islamic 
movements quickly created an Islamic political imaginary2 for workers and 
their descendents. This imaginary has been entertained since the veil debate and 
 Salman Rushdie’s affair in 1989. Muslim Ideologues crafted a series of myths to 
sustain „Muslimness”: Palestine, the narrative of injustice, the Muslim communi-
ty, the conspiracy of media, Andalusia, the veil and other symbols, “our identity”, 
the halal food, Islamic finance, etc. 
The narrative of “Muslim identity”, always expressed in the third person,3 
hides the subjectivity of every subject who is an immigrant worker or a descen-
dent of immigration. It refers to an “original Muslim identity” that never was. 
 Nationals from Turkey and Morocco do not define themselves as Muslims in 
terms of their identity, but as Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Moroccans, Amazigh, etc. One 
cannot belong to “an identity” that does not exist.4 That is why it is a simulacrum. 
Furthermore, the first generation of immigrants was cut from Islam as a discur-
sive tradition. The second generation, under the influence of religious policies 
of “Muslim states” and Islamic movements, connected with a discursive tradi-
tion they found dignifying, burying themselves in a de- subjectifying imagined 
 identity.
The “Muslim” subject is yet to fully claim reflexivity and active citizen-
ship in European societies. It is the case that many immigrant workers or their 
 descendants consider themselves citizens and act as such. However, the dominat-
ing trend of Islamic intellectuals and activists continuously enhances the narrative 
of “Muslim identity”. In the following, I suggest a philosophical-anthropological 
inquiry into the problem of “Muslim identity” in Europe through four voices: 
T. Ramadan, an advocate of the narrative of “Muslim identity”, and three secular 
2 Werbner 1998. 11-31.
3 Tan 2008. 31-49. 
4 Shively 2006. 537-542. This does not exclude religion from being a component of identity.
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Muslim intellectuals who criticize this narrative and rebuild the “Muslim” subject 
as citizen (M. Chebel, F. Benslama and L. Babès). While Ramadan has been the 
subject of dozens of studies, this paper offers the first scholarly study on Chebel5, 
Benslama and Babès.6
Tariq Ramadan and the imagined “Muslim identity”
T. Ramadan (Born in 1962) is a Swiss intellectual of Egyptian origin who is par-
ticularly active in France, Qatar and the UK. He studied philosophy and French 
literature, and obtained a PhD in Islamic studies at the University of Geneva. 
He completed his academic studies with a brief training at Al-Azhar between 
1992-1993 then 1994-1995. Although he negates having organisational links to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, he still claims the intellectual heritage of Ḥasan al-Bannā, 
the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. He is also under the heavy influence of 
other Islamic ideologues.
T. Ramadan formulates the question of “Muslim identity” as follows: 
“We are entitled to our values and our identity […] the law man-
ages specific and shared values”.7
This statement implies a series of understatements. To begin with, it entails 
that there is a “universal Muslim identity” that adapts to the local context, and in 
this case, the European context. While this might be tempting for some Muslims 
to imagine such identity, going so far as to call it an umma, it is a religious ideal, 
not a reality. An Indonesian and a Qatari do not share a Muslim identity. They 
share a religion, but their identities are composed of different ethnic, social and 
cultural elements that radically separate them, the same way a Christian from 
Texas does not share the same identity with a Christian from Kenya.8 
T. Ramadan, like most Muslim thinkers today, attempts to resolve the prob-
lem of this “unidentified Muslim identity”, by using the vague expression of 
“the principles of Muslim identity”, meaning the foundational texts, beliefs and 
practices required by God and his Prophet.9 These are the guiding lines of such 
5 Ruth Mas dedicated a study to Chebel’s secular views of love, but not as a Muslim intellectual: 
Mas 2004. 273-301.
6 Franck Fregosi offers a useful, although general description of the field of Muslim intellectuals 
in France in: Fregosi 2008. 93-115.
7 Ramadan 2008.
8 In his study of Muslims in Mumbai, Ari Singh Anand shows that „the ostensibly ‘religious’ 
domain of Islam is not necessarily the only, or even primary, basis for achieving a self-consciously 
ethical selfhood for even those who identify as observant and devout Muslims […] the religious 
domain of Islam in this context is defined as such and intersected by discourses and practices of the 
self as a political and economic agent defined largely in terms of political modernity”. Anand 2014. 
377-398. 
9 Ramadan 2008. 
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 identity. A modern reader, embedded with the ethical sense of the word princi-
ples, could think of a principle such as human dignity. It is not the case in Rama-
dan’s use of the word principle which has here a religious sense, that of concrete 
regulations of Islamic law and belief. There are two additional problems with “the 
principles of Muslim identity”. On the one hand, they are not the same for a Salafi, 
a Muslim Brother, a Shīʿī, or secular Muslims. On the other, “these principles” 
are but the tenets of Islamic law which cannot be sustained in the modern world, 
let alone in European societies. “These principles” lead simply to the disintegra-
tion of modern societies. Ramadan’s vocabulary might be misleading. The use of 
terms such as principles, spirituality, and intelligence to find “shared meaning” 
between Muslims and non-Muslims is ambiguous. These terms bear a different 
content whether we think within a post-secular perspective (the case of Christian-
ity) or pre-secular (the case of Islam). It would be naïve and erroneous to consider 
the use of these terms as equivalent. 
Let us examine further the term principle. Ramadan employs it, on the one 
side, to convey the reformist meaning of return to the foundations, which involves 
the by-passing of centuries of Islamic legacy. He sees the Islamic civilisation in 
two versions: one common and the other specific. As he puts it: “The great Islamic 
civilization and its specificities: Persian, African, Arab or western. While there are 
superior common features, there are also distinctions in culture and language and 
peculiarities at the level of nations”.10 Universal Muslim identity emerges in the 
making, or rather, in the de-making of these foundations. Is it possible to go to the 
foundations without the whole Muslim tradition? Hermeneutically, it is a vicious 
circle and impossible to achieve. For the link to the principles is only possible 
through history and language, and we understand both at the point where we are 
because they reached us with a certain meaning they assigned to the foundations. 
On the other side, he means by principle that which is immutable. This includes 
values and beliefs that cannot be conceded to any other culture or society, and 
which are rooted in the foundations. They are the core of what a Muslim is. Rama-
dan’s fundamentalist vicious circle is full: whether from today (identity) or from 
the past (principles), Muslims are “condemned” to their “origins”.
Ramadan believes that law is different from values and the national identity of 
a modern state. This error of thought might come from two reasons: T. Ramadan’s 
20th century Islamic ideology which is very suspicious of law and the state, seeing 
positive law as illegitimate, or at least as “technical”. Only Islamic law is absolute, 
and therefore expresses, presumably, the “Muslim values” and “identity”. In a 
secular world, law does not support the religious specificities of communities; 
it regulates and protects the rights of the citizens, including religious rights, but 
does not support “religious identities”.
Additionally, there cannot be a constructive community that upholds its own 
values while it shares at the same time other values with the rest of the society. 
Common values are formed by social institutions and secular policies over time, 
and by way of interactions between individuals. So, Muslims ought to be secular 
10 Ramadan 2009. 265.
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in order to live and participate in European societies. Certainty, these values can-
not be claims. For if they exist, they cannot be claimed and if they do not exist, 
they cannot be invented. At any rate, a claim within a given society is only receiv-
able inasmuch as it is formulated in the terms defined by this society, its values 
and laws.
T. Ramadan usually uses the phrase “common values”, referring to values 
Muslims and non-Muslims share such as freedom. He divides people on the basis 
of religion while the road to these “common values” was secular and historical. 
Individuals cherish freedom, not as Muslims or Christians, but as modern sub-
jects. For Ramadan, values should emerge from the two books: the book of revela-
tion and the book of nature.11 It is evident that non-Muslims, conceded that such 
identification is possible in a modern world, cannot accept to share any values 
with Muslims that are based on a book of revelation. Modernity has introduced 
differentiation as a major mechanism of knowledge and organisation. Truth is 
what humans can verify and nobody can judge the truth of the book of revelation. 
Besides, no single truth could be found in the intersection of the book of revela-
tion and the book of nature. All that could be meaningful if “Muslims” gener-
ate one reading of this “one book” of revelation (which is not true considering 
the differences in both corpuses and interpretations of Muslim traditions). Since 
the “one truth” is non-verifiable and non-existent, from any stance we take, it 
cannot be a truth.
Malek Chebel and the quest of the subject in Islam
Born (in 1953) and raised in Algeria, M. Chebel immigrated to France in the seven-
ties as a student. He got his PhD in clinical psychopathology and psychoanaly-
sis at the University Paris 7 (1980), a second doctorate in anthropology, ethnol-
ogy and religious studies at Jussieu (1982) and a third PhD degree in political 
science at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (1984). As a public intellectual, 
he engages, particularly, in the debates on islam des Lumières, the body and the 
subject in Islam. 
Chebel addresses the question of identity as a problem of subjectivity in Islam. 
He asks a double question: 
„Is Islam able to establish an identity without the latter being con-
fronted with otherness, and amended by it, enriched? Which sources 
and which events will produce self-image, and therefore the image 
of the other?”12
11 Ramadan 2008. 169.
12 Chebel 2002. 127.
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The answer to the second question comes from his islam des Lumières. In 2004, 
he suggested 27 ideas to reform Islam: Respect of the other, freedom of thought 
and consciousness, pre-eminence of the individual over the community, human-
ism, pre-eminence of reason over any other form of thought and belief, etc.13 
Chebel refers to a different Islamic repertoire than Ramadan’s. He turns to Islam 
as a civilisation, with its achievements in Muslim philosophy, popular religion, 
 literature, especially literature of pleasure, rational theology and Sufism. In other 
words, he endorses the interpretations of Islam that are post-foundational and 
non- orthodox, the function of which, for him, is to free Muslims from orthodoxy, 
the guardian of the foundations. 
To the first question, Chebel answers that „Islam does not favor the emergence 
of an autonomous subject escaping religious imprint”.14 There is, however, hope 
for secularized Muslims, to emerge as modern subjects:
“There remains to the Muslim the possibility to turn from a being-
within-the-realm of God to the social and political individual and ac-
quire an interactive citizenship in the Umma. But to properly reinvest 
Socius without leaving its faith, the being-of-belief must first undock 
the close link that binds it to the institution of the mosque, as well as 
granted the impressive prerogatives to it […] the birth of the Muslim 
citizenship has this as a price: turning its back to the mosque without 
removing God from its vital horizon.”15
In Chebel’s mind, there is a link between space and identity. Disconnecting the 
individual from spaces governed by Islamic law, foundational to “Muslim iden-
tity”, is, thus, a first step towards a modern subject in Islam. It takes the opposite 
strategy of the promoters of “Muslim identity” in Europe who unceasingly build 
mosques. After all, secularisation is about separating spaces, which is necessary 
to any modernisation process. This is the first step. Modernisation and the emer-
gence of the subject have to address two additional challenges: those of thought 
and action if one might isolate them as categories. As a mode of thought, Islam 
discourages autonomy of the self with regard to traditions. Thought should be 
principled. Social and political structures, which are traditional or semi-traditional, 
hurdle further the liberation of the subject. Despite all modern techniques, the 
state in Islam acts as a commander of the believers:
„The Muslim subject exists today in an area that the Muslim 
‘moral clergy’ still held in awe, at the same time causing a critical 
reading of its realization in the concrete world. The paradox re-
mains unresolved: one cannot in Islam today become a subject of 
action and reaction, an autonomous subject of movement without 
13 Chebel 2004.
14 Chebel 2002. 127.
15 Chebel 2002. 269-270.
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the intercession of the „state manager” itself not yet completely 
free from the mosque. At the outset, Islam amalgamated the contin-
gency of the human being with its projection in an afterlife far more 
rewarding.”16 
Chebel takes the opposite standpoint of T. Ramadan. He successfully and 
rightly shifts the focus from the texts to the subject, from an ethical-juristic per-
spective to anthropological-philosophical-psychological one. There is a long way 
to go from the current status where solution is seen outside the humans to the 
emergence of a modern subject, and therefore, of conditions in which identity 
actively functions as a process:
“After the critical phase of identifying with the model of ances-
tors, considered to be ideal and perfectly reconstructed in so many 
aspects, Muslims will have to display their determination vis-à-vis 
the many choices available to them. For the true post-oedipal bifur-
cation lies here: how can they now accept themselves without turn-
ing their backs on modernity? how can they access modernity – and 
which one? – Without turning their backs on their faith? This double 
challenge of earning modernity without losing faith is central to their 
contemporary history unless they are reluctant to cut the Gordian 
knot.”17 
Some anthropologists would disagree with Chebel. For example, Saba 
Mahmood, inspired by Talal Asad, argues for „uncoupling the notion of agency 
from that of resistance as a necessary step in thinking about forms of desire and 
politics that do not accord with norms of secular-liberal feminism and its libera-
tory telos”.18 In other words, a modern subject might emerge in Islam without the 
secular-liberal norms. Mahmoud’s thesis has its own flaws. Suffice it here to un-
derline one major shortcoming; Mahmoud engages the debate on the subject from 
a post-feminist and post-modern perspective. That is to say, she acknowledges 
different forms of subjectivity as equally valid. Women in Egypt, her field of 
study, live a pre-secular and modern daily life, under the pressure of patriarchal 
religious and social order. They aspire to modernity, but cannot have  access to it, 
and turn to different modes of negotiation with the pre-modern world. A modern 
subject cannot emerge without traditional or semi-traditional norms.  
16 Chebel 2002. 283.
Recently, Kabir reminded us of the dogmatic character of the state in Turkey, the only secular 
state in the Muslim world. As he puts it, “departures from otherwise salient norms do not of necessity 
challenge the dominant forms of reflexivity. More often, they place at risk the coherence of the 
deviating utterance or act itself”. Tambar 2012. 669.
17 Chebel 2002. 285.
18 Mahmoud 2006. 31.
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Fethi Benslama
In 1972, Benslama (born in 1951) emigrated from Tunisia to France as a student. 
He studied psychopathology at the prestigious Paris 7 and anthropology at the 
EHESS. He got a PhD in psychology in Paris 13 (1999). His family in Tunisia 
has deep interest in the Islamic legacy, and particularly in the interpretation of 
dreams. Raja Benslama, his sister is also a psychoanalyst, and scholar of Muslim 
traditions and Arabic literature. F. Benslama has contributed much to the debates 
on psychoanalysis and Islam. His two projects: Le manifeste des libertés and raison 
et déraison en islam have attracted the interest and the support of a multitude of 
intellectuals in France and Belgium.
Benslama uses Islamic mysticism and tools of psychoanalysis in the study 
of Islam as a religion and a political system. He is influenced by Jacques Lacan, 
Freud, Ibn ʿArabī, Avicenne, Averroès and Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭāhā. Despite a 
somewhat similar curriculum to that of Chebel, their approaches are quite differ-
ent. Chebel combines anthropology and history, with a clear historical imprint, 
which makes him an islamologue in the eyes of the media. On the other hand, 
psychoanalysis dominates Benslama’s analysis. He focuses primarily on the col-
lective delirium of the return to origins that led to the attempt to return and clone 
the “original” Islam by force, leading to accuse most Muslims today of disbelief. 
To explain radicalism, he resorts to the notion of despair of the masses. It is this 
despair that in his view explains the narrative of “Muslim identity”. 
Benslama believes that primary identities and affiliations [family, clan, reli-
gion, region, etc.] should be virtually destroyed, not to be altogether eliminated, 
but rebuilt as specific expressions and mediation of collective political identity 
or membership (under the influence of Balibar and Hegel). This rebuilt collective 
identity should be secular:
“When the religious institution decomposes as it happens chroni-
cally, and it is the case of Islam today, the invasion of demonic and 
archaic forces - where there is blurring of boundaries between the 
animal and human - sprayed dikes of reason as to produce an iden-
tity delirium which, like any delirium, considers itself a cure. But 
secularism as we understand it is another cure for the myth of iden-
tity, which does not reject the principle of the responsibility of the 
human with respect to any other, but gives this responsibility politi-
cal effectiveness through the subject citizen.”19
Benslama deconstructs the narrative of “Muslim identity” at its inception. For 
him, the whole idea of „islamic identity” is but a symptom of a pre-modern sub-
ject, who submits to religious and political structures in which divine law and 
authoritarian order are the keywords. The modern subject emerged in the revolu-
tion against these traditional structues. As he himself states it:
19 Benslama 2005. 60.
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„The traditional subject (‘abd), although possessing all the pre-
rogatives of a subject of law (and divine law is a law and not an 
arbitrary power), remains subject to a theological - political structure 
whose goal is to harmonize the human identification of individuality 
with God and the political space. That structure attempts to govern 
the psyche and society at the same time. But the modern subject ad-
dressed by psychoanalysis appears in societies where the separation 
between the birth community and the political community has taken 
place through a civil revolution backed by a powerful government 
apparatus. We should not forget that, in the traditional world, the 
patriarchal structure made the father both a paterfamilias and a po-
litical leader, since the space of the group and that of society were 
nearly the same. Filiation determined power.”20
This explains why God appears in Ramadan’s question about identity. In the 
narrative of „Muslim identity”, God warrants the discourse about „Muslim poli-
tics”, „Muslim community” and „Muslim society”. Being a servant of God is con-
sidered compatible with being a citizen of a European state. There lies the critical 
point about the narrative of „Muslim identity”. Being a citizen of a modern state 
cannot happen without a political philosophy in which political theology is dis-
qualified. This is not the case in a „Muslim community” where theology, includ-
ing political theology, puts the citizen after God and his mediators. Schizophrenia 
takes place and some violently try to solve the contradictions of a political double 
life imposed by a modern political philosophy and a pre-modern political theol-
ogy.
Furthermore, the claims of „Muslim identity” reveal a pathological relation 
between identity and alterity: 
„The masses – and not only in the case of Islam – have been 
dragged in all directions toward unreasonable claims of identity, 
which can result in the cruelest acts of violence under the guise of 
appropriating the proper of who they are. By the same token, we 
willingly proclaim the destruction of the proper of the other, hoping 
to deprive him and his humanity of it, leaving him as exposed as a 
skinned animal. I have suggested using the term expropriation to re-
fer to this sense of threat to the proper of what one is, as well as to the 
desire to dispossess the other because he might prevent the “Self” or 
the “Us” of the community from remaining the same. Expropriation 
appears to overflow the classic concept of the death drive, to the ex-
tent that it does not cease with the reduction to inanimacy but aims 
at the annihilation of qualities relative to identification, symbolic 
20 Benslama 2009. 203.
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genealogy, and alterity. Thus, expropriation would be at the root of 
any transindividual processes that feed genocidal hatred.”21
Benslama’s expropriation is intriguing and deserves an inquiry on its own. It 
starts as disidentification. The latter constitutes the core of the narrative of “Mus-
lim identity”; it separates identity and alterity and disengages from society. For 
any “Muslim” born in Europe, and not only, is one and the other, whereby iden-
tity and alterity are components of its subjectivity. By disidentification from its so-
ciety, the individual expropriates its own complex identity. M. Verkuyten and A. 
A. Yildiz have studied identification among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. They con-
cluded that „Many participants show low commitment to the nation, and many 
indicate national disidentification. In addition, there is very strong ethnic and reli-
gious identification. Ethnic and Muslim identifications relate negatively to Dutch 
identification and to stronger Dutch disidentification”. 22 
Essentialisation is another form of expropriation. We have come across Rama-
dan’s insistence on the “principles of Muslim identity” and its “essential common 
features”. It is a process of de-pluralisation of Islam, eliminating all the cultur-
al diversity and historical evolution of Islam. It is exactly what fundamentalism 
does: reducing the complexity of history into the fundaments of theology and 
working to bring people to those fundaments. Another study about cross-national 
comparison of British Bangladeshis in London and Spanish Moroccans in Madrid 
has highlighted the process of essentialisation. It is showed that:
“Subjects’ multiplicity is complicated by their desire to meet – not 
reject – the essentialist standards of belonging to the identity para-
digms discursively available to them. Rather than defiantly cherry-
picking preferred characteristics of religion, ethnicity and national-
ity, individuals’ responses suggest that they are trying to fulfil per-
ceived standards of authenticity. Such a contention helps explain the 
prevalence of Western Muslims’ expressed and well-documented 
‘identity crisis’, suggests the enduring relevance of identity essen-
tialisms, and more broadly, complicates post-modern conceptions of 
identity formation.”23
Moreover, expropriation acts as concealment. The narrative of “Muslim iden-
tity” hides an indecisive subject, unwilling “to cut the Gordian knot”, in a position 
between pre-modernity and modernity. Consider Žižek’s magisterial reading, in-
spired by Benslama, of the function of the veil in Islam, an important marker of 
“Muslim identity” in Europe. Žižek suggests that:
21 Benslama 2009. 54
22 Verkuyten – Yildiz 2007. 1448.
23 Gest 2015. 1868.
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“What if the true scandal this veil endeavors to obfuscate is not 
the feminine body hidden by it, but the INEXISTENCE of the femi-
nine? What if, consequently, the ultimate function of the veil is pre-
cisely to sustain the illusion that there IS something, the substantial 
Thing, behind the veil? If, following Nietzsche’s equation of truth 
and woman, we transpose the feminine veil into the veil which con-
ceals the ultimate Truth, the true stakes of the Muslim veil become 
even clearer. Woman is a treat because she stands for the “unde-
cidability” of truth, for a succession of veils beneath which there is 
no ultimate hidden core; by veiling her, we create the illusion that 
there is, beneath the veil, the feminine Truth - the horrible truth of 
lie and deception, of course. Therein resides the concealed scandal 
of Islam: only a woman, the very embodiment of the indiscernabil-
ity of truth and lie, can guarantee Truth. For this reason, she has to 
remain veiled.”24
As it seems to me, the truth fundamentalism shies away from is modernity. 
A fundamentalist is a reluctant individual: unable to live in the past and too fear-
ful to embrace the present. The narrative of “Muslim identity” is not, in reality, 
a step into the past, but a jump into the dark (religious violence could be the 
ultimate sign of this jump). It attempts to solve the problem by inventing a simu-
lacrum. In particular, the veil is an emblematic symbol of expropriation and des-
identification. First, the veil des-identifies the subject, establishing a boundary be-
tween the veiled woman and society. She wants society to see her veiled, claiming 
the right to be in the public space equally to other non-veiled women. A paradox 
of its own; she refuses to be equal to other women and takes the veil, and then, she 
wants to be treated as equal to those she withdrew from. It is a visible example of 
expropriation. Second, the veil reduces a woman into a principled religious being, 
a believer who obeys to God’s commandment (of veiling), thus essentializing her 
complex identity. The rejection of society is in fact a denial of what makes her 
identity since all the complex elements of her identity, and alterity should I add, 
reside in her society. Finally, she conceals her subjectivity by taking the mask of 
a “Muslim identity”. Modern subjectivity is a heavy responsibility. For many in-
dividuals, the mask of a “Muslim identity” allows them to retreat and get an easy 
narrative to relate to, instead of facing the world as it is. This narrative gained 
notoriety in the seventies and the veil became its symbol: in the aftermath of 1967 
war, the failure of development policies and modernisation. Islamic fundamen-
talism offered the perfect mask; on the one hand, it is a refuge from successive 
defeats, blaming it all on the distance Muslims took from “True Islam”. On the 
other, it is a merciless and nihilist machine of war.
24 Žižek 2006.
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Leïla Babès
Similarly to Chebel, Babès emigrated from Algeria to France as a student in the 
seventies. She obtained a Master degree in political science from the University 
of Provence (1981) and a PhD in Political Science at Aix-Marseille 3 (1984). She 
turned, however, later to sociology, and especially sociology of religion which she 
teaches as a Professor at the Catholic University of Lille. Babès has been known to 
promote secularism and an “interior” and “positive Islam”.
Babès considers that all projects carried out to fix the world according to the 
Islamic ideal only led to demolish the state and the political space. She promotes 
new relations between constructed and lived Islam. She is interested in the re-
ligious emotion which is expressed by other means than the doctrinal teaching 
(trance or female devotions, worship of saints, couscous as a gift and sacrifice), 
that is to say a plural and multifaceted Islam, anthropological and not theologi-
cal. She wants to rehabilitee the spiritual dimension in order to reinterpret Islam 
as a religion of belief that postulates the primacy of the heart. By the same token, 
it perceives Islam as a religion of balance, of the measure, but also of the niyya, 
 purity of intention, admitting, however, the social constraints of morality, the 
community and law in Islam.25 
This spiritual path finds echo in the Sufi way. Babès is not a Sufi, however. 
Rather she adheres to “a spirituality of belief”. She argues that young Muslims 
in Europe hold on to Islam as religion of the heart.  Spiritualization could help to 
construe the law favoring its allegorical meaning.  Spiritualization cannot achieve 
its re-reading of Islam unless it is founded on secularization of Islam which im-
plies a double objection process of ritual, a practice of social conformity, and a 
critical sense that combines intellectual rigor and spiritual expectation. She coined 
the phrases “interior Islam” and “positive Islam” to identify this spiritualization 
and secularisation of Islam.
Nevertheless, Babès does not reject the idea of return to “principles” and 
“ essence” of Islam. Her “matrix of Islam” is different from that of Ramadan’s:
“Actually, there is return, but to the essential, to the spirit and not 
the letter, a liberating, and egalitarian ethics, to the use of reason and 
intellect, not signs of reification, a legacy from another era. Does this 
imply a rejection of the normative reference? Islamic law has been a 
structuring reference for Muslim being, to the point that the aban-
donment of personal status for Muslims in French Algeria meant 
renouncing their identity. But keep in mind that Islam is a religion 
of belief that postulates the primacy of the heart. Social constraint of 
morality, the community standard is not greater than eschatology. 
Despite being a religion of law, Islam remains a religion of balance, 
25 Babès 2000. 32.
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of the measure, but also of the niyya, purity of intention. The ques-
tion of religious practice is inseparable from faith and extends be-
yond orthopraxis. The canonical observances say nothing (or very 
little) of the question, the deep belief or practice at large (individual 
ethics).”26
Babès suggests an alternative narrative to that of “Muslim identity”. It is based 
on living Islam as a spirituality, a Christianized Islam, so to speak, which achieves 
more than a goal: it is a positive Islam in the sense that it refers to the lived reality 
of young Muslims in Europe. It also disconnects Muslims in Europe from law and 
its guardians and spaces (the mosque and the jurists). Finally, it fits completely in 
the framework of a secular society as it is a private interior religiosity. Her answer 
to the narrative of „Muslim identity” is incisive:
“I do not like feeling trapped in an identity. Mine is multiple, 
plural. It may be moving. It is not final. I do not belong to any par-
ticular community. Religions are worn by peoples’ cultures, cus-
toms, norms, social change. What interests me is how people stand 
in relation to this change. Their relationship to modernity. Thus, in 
Islam, with its plural traditions and how things are changing in rela-
tion to modernity, to change, to the Western Traditions themselves is 
not static. It is not monolithic. It is made of controversies, contradic-
tions. We must turn our backs on a fixed perception of Islam, where 
Muslims would be amalgamated by a culture, a tradition evenly. No, 
Muslims are not determined by diagrams, pictures. There is a plural-
ity of meanings and references we should try to rehabilitate.”27
It might be said that the narrative of “Muslim identity” claims as well a Eu-
ropean American identity. For example, D. D. Zimmerman shows that young 
Muslim women in the United States „develop coexisting identities in an attempt 
to escape categorization as either oppressed or liberated, and to negotiate their 
identity between integration and loyalty to religion, ethnicity, community and 
family”.28 In the process of negotiation, the young women came to claim strong 
signs of Muslimness such as the veil to comply with the pressure of the communi-
ties. The notion of negotiation is too vague. If it means to seek balance between 
the commandments of God and the citizenship, then the modern subject is not yet 
born in „Western Islam”. Certainly, any modern subject negotiates within a situ-
ation or a context, the different elements of its identity, but within the realm of 
human society and norms. Negotiation does not mean the same thing to a modern 
subject and to a pre-modern individual. For the latter, God is the ruler of a system 
in which are entangled the family, the clan, the community and the religious ritu-
26 Babes 2000. 31-32.
27 Babes 2011.
28 Zimmerman 2014. 311. 
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als and guardians. Concessions are made to this system because it primes over 
modernity. A modern subject does not consider God as a ruler and all concessions 
go the other way around. This marks the difference between Babès and Ramadan:
“In this relationship with God, placed in a context of constant 
search, the focus is on personal experience, verbalized by concepts 
of inquiry and path. Their29 religious experience thus appears as a 
kind of movement, an upward curve. Relatively speaking, this phe-
nomenon seems more lean that Glock called experimental dimen-
sion, that of the spiritual life and actual experience, rather than fall 
into the ideological dimension, that of beliefs and religious feelings. 
But what there is precisely in this modern attitude is the will of dis-
tancing from the community consensus, and any institutional repre-
sentation in favor of a symbolic capital not new, but delved into the 
religious Tradition and reinterpreted in the light of a purely indi-
vidual emotion.”30
As a sociologist, Babès underlines the complexity of modern societies. There is 
no way to claim a domination of a narrative of “Muslim identity”, while in reality 
the majority of young Muslims do not practice religion. She turns this lived re-
ligiosity into a form of Islam capable of modernisation. It gives full agency to the 
modern subject to reconsider the Tradition and live it as an individual experience, 
afar from any communitarian sense. Here lies the difficult issue: the narrative of 
“Muslim identity” finds ground in isolated communities, ghettos, where people 
start to distance themselves socially and culturally from the mainstream society. 
A double movement is needed then: modern societies reclaiming conceded places 
to “Muslim communities” and intellectually speaking a critical thought of mod-
ern subjectivity to deconstruct the illusions of “Muslim identity”.
Conclusion
It has been shown that the narrative of “Muslim identity” relies on a vague idea 
about the “Muslim principles and values”. It constructs an artificial “Muslimness” 
out of imagined origins of Islam. It is an-anti modern thought, which in practice, 
leads to disintegration, des-identification, expropriation, concealment and essen-
tialisation. Any discourse on Muslim identity is an illusion, an intellectual ghetto 
and a radical act. It assumes that Muslim Identity is static and unilateral self and 
the other interact in permanent construction. The solution to a concrete social 
problem can not be identity. All this does not make the identity problem a valid 
29 She refers to a majority of young Muslims she studied in France in the nineties and their „islam 
positif”.
30 Babés 1996. 131.
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problem. For one is always the one and the other. That is why the question asked 
by T. Ramadan is false. For everyone is at the same time the one and the other, 
and God cannot want two things at the same time, in the same person. Theology 
put apart, for anthropological reasons, humans change over time and place and 
evolve. 
Can there be a way out from the narrative of Muslim identity? This article 
contributes to existing knowledge on identity and alterity as one complex process 
with multiple aspects by providing evidence from three critical Muslim intellec-
tuals (Chebel, Benslama and Babès). These intellectuals deconstruct the narrative 
of “Muslim identity” through different mechanisms. Chebel uses the rationalist 
repertoire of Islamic civilisation to offer an alternative “origin” which finds its 
continuity in Western modernity. Chebel believes that without the emergence of 
the modern subject and freedom from subjection to the community, there can-
not be subjectivity, and therefore, modernity in Islam. Benslama draws attention 
to the pathological character of the narrative of “Muslim identity” by which it 
oeuvres for expropriation of the other. Babès suggests an interior Islam, a sort of 
post-modern spirituality in which the modern subject establishes a link with God, 
discarding the juridical and communitarian aspects of Islam.
The contribution of this study has been to put forward that the narrative of 
“Muslim identity” is neither valid nor inevitable. It also showed that critical Mus-
lim intellectuals are able to provide viable alternatives. Concrete measures to com-
pete with the narrative of “Muslim identity” have been taken. Chebel founded the 
Review of Enlightenment Noor and Benslama a University of Freedoms. Certainly, 
there are limitations of such initiatives and the logistics of the fundamentalist out-
weigh those of critical intellectuals. At any rate, it remains possible to reclaim lost 
spaces to Islamic fundamentalism and its rhetoric. 
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